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As tort liability for emotional distress has expanded, courts have
failed to develop concomitant rules governing the mitigation of emo-
tional injuries. The liberalization of emotional distress recovery has
given rise to a vigorous debate over whether such damages promote
fairness and economic efficiency or whether they instead result in
overcompensation to plaintiffs and threaten to burden defendants
with "potentially infinite liability beyond any rational relationship to
their culpability."' But neither side in this controversy has considered
what the absence of mitigation standards shows about the desirability
of emotional distress liability.
The absence of mitigation rules means that tort liability for emo-
tional injuries creates moral hazard problems that tend to result in in-
efficiently low levels of post-injury care by plaintiffs and systematic
overcompensation. For example, if psychiatric treatment might reduce
or eliminate a plaintiff's emotional distress, the plaintiff might none-
theless forgo such treatment if he knows that the defendant will be li-
able for the full, unmitigated level of distress. Looking at emotional
distress law from the mitigation perspective reveals that some of the
rules governing emotional distress liability may exacerbate the moral
hazard. For example, in the absence of a mitigation rule, the require-
ment in some torts that plaintiff must have "severe" distress may actu-
ally give plaintiff a disincentive to try to reduce his damages. It also
shows that the most serious emotional injuries do not create the most
moral hazard, suggesting that popular tort reform measures like dam-
age caps would do little to reduce the overcompensation for emo-
tional distress attributable to moral hazard.
There are good reasons for the absence of mitigation rules for
emotional distress. Possible standards for emotional distress mitiga-
tion would either be difficult for courts to administer or would fail to
satisfy the mitigation goal of joint-cost minimization Because of the
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1 Dillon v Legg, 68 Cal 2d 728, 441 P2d 912, 928 (1968) (Burke dissenting) (dissenting
from landmark case allowing recovery to mother for emotional distress caused by seeing her
child killed by a negligent motorist).
2 Joint-cost minimization requires each actor to reduce the total cost of the injury, some-
times even when doing so increases his share of the total cost. See Charles J. Goetz and Robert
E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va L
Rev 967, 973-76 (1983) (arguing that a mitigation rule in contracts generally stands for a joint-
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difficulty of creating satisfactory mitigation rules for emotional dis-
tress, courts must limit moral hazard in emotional distress cases by
limiting the scope of liability or recovery.
Courts wishing to limit moral hazard in emotional distress torts, a
form of third-party insurance, should look to the methods used by
first-party insurers, who first coined the term "moral hazard." How-
ever, the first-best methods, like copayments and deductibles, do not
translate well into the third-party insurance context because the total
amount plaintiff can recover is endogenous to the litigation process. A
combination of damage caps and floors, or workmen's compensation-
style damage schedules, could help control moral hazard when the
emotional distress recovery is an element of consequential damages.
However, such legislative solutions would be incoherent when applied
to emotional distress as an independent tort. In such actions, the best
way for courts to control moral hazard would be to return to the re-
cently disfavored approach of allowing recovery only in categories of
cases where objectively verifiable circumstances, such as a crippling
wound, allow courts to infer severe emotional distress with a high de-
gree of confidence.
Part I first describes the contours of emotional distress liability
and then explains the mitigation doctrine and its goal of reducing
moral hazard. This Part shows that courts have failed to apply mitiga-
tion to emotional distress, while applying it to all other areas of tort li-
ability. Part II finds that moral hazard exists in emotional distress li-
ability, resulting in systematic overcompensation. However, this Part
shows that the level of hazard varies across the different contexts in
which plaintiffs recover for emotional distress.
Part III considers what emotional distress mitigation would look
like. This Part rejects the superficially appealing standard of psychiat-
ric or psychotropic mitigation as being unlikely to satisfy the joint-cost
minimization criteria in a large number of cases. It also finds unsatis-
factory an alternate paradigm, willpower mitigation, whereby plain-
tiffs must take reasonable efforts to exercise self-control and disci-
pline to reduce their emotional distress. Part IV considers ways courts
can reduce the moral hazard inherent in emotional distress damages
without a mitigation rule. It suggests limiting the availability of emo-
tional distress damages to objectively defined categories, and eliminat-
ing the subjective severity test used by some courts in the tort of neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress.
cost minimization requirement).
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I. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS LIABILITY AND MITIGATION
A. The Expansion of Emotional Distress Liability
The history of emotional distress represents an ongoing attempt
by courts to balance the conflicting goals of full compensation and
precluding fraudulent or de minimis claims -with the balance shifting
ever more towards compensation. Courts began allowing recovery for
emotional distress in narrowly defined sets of circumstances at the
start of the twentieth century. Since then, the availability of such
damages has expanded greatly.! But the inchoate, subjective nature of
such claims has created significant problems of measurement and
proof. Thus, at each stage of the liability expansion, courts have at-
tempted to limit recovery to categories of cases where the emotional
distress seems most likely to be genuine and substantial, such as where
the distress flows from a physical injury to a plaintiff.6 These limita-
tions have been criticized for being arbitrarily over- and underinclu-
sive: some apparently deserving plaintiffs would be denied recovery
because the injury did not fall within the category, while plaintiffs with
less intuitively appealing claims could recover. For example, the physi-
cal injury requirement could deny recovery to a plaintiff negligently
3 These damages go under a bewildering variety of names: "emotional distress," "emo-
tional anguish," "severe emotional distress," "mental distress," "mental disturbance," "emotional
disturbance," and "mental anguish." See, for example, Clohessy v Bachelor, 237 Conn 31,675 A2d
852, 853, 855-56, 859, 863 (1996) (using interchangeably all of the above terms to describe psy-
chic injury suffered by mother and child as a result of seeing mother's other child fatally injured
in an automobile accident). There are apparently no differences either in medicine or law be-
tween such terms. See Douglas J. Whaley, Paying For the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional Dis-
tress Damages in Contract Actions, 26 Suffolk U L Rev 935,939 n 15 (1992) (considering to what
extent recovery for emotional distress damages should be permitted in contract suits through, in
part, an examination of such damages in tort law). Also, the distinction between emotional or
mental damages and "pain and suffering" has caused confusion, see id, though these are in fact
distinct categories. "Pain and suffering" generally denotes the actual pain caused by physical in-
jury, whereas mental distress is a higher-order cognitive reaction to physical or other injury. See
Steven P Croley and Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-And-Suffering
Damages in Tort Law, 108 Harv L Rev 1785, 1789 n 11 (1995) (distinguishing among various
"species of nonpecuniary losses" recognized by courts).
4 See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 Geo Wash L Rev 136, 142 nn 29-30,32 (1992) (citing
cases).
5 See Payton v Abbott Labs, 386 Mass 540, 437 NE2d 171, 176-78 (1982) (examining the
development of emotional distress damages); Levit, 61 Geo Wash L Rev at 140-46 (cited in
note 4) (chronicling the growth of emotional distress liability); Whaley, 26 Suffolk U L Rev at
940-46 (cited in note 3) (same); Stuart M. Speiser, et al, 4 The American Law of Torts ch 16 (Law
Co-op 1987) (describing the variety of situations where emotional distress damages have been
allowed).
6 See Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co v Buckley, 521 US 424,433 (1997) (explaining
that common law courts created categories to limit emotional distress recovery because ofL
among other reasons, the "special 'difficult[y] for judges and juries' in separating valid, important
claims from those that are invalid and or 'trivial"'); Payton, 437 NE2d at 178-79 (describing
problems involved in dealing with emotional distress damages stemming from difficulty in de-
termining which emotional injuries were "real" and "serious").
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misdiagnosed with AIDS, but allow recovery to one with a paper cut.
As a result, courts have abandoned many of the doctrinal limitations,
and gradually moved closer to recognizing a general legally protected
"interest in personal emotional stability."7 With negligent infliction of
emotional distress torts ("NIED") -actions that could afford the
broadest basis of liability-courts continue to struggle to create sensi-
ble limits on recovery while avoiding arbitrary limitations.
1. Emotional distress as part of consequential damages.
Courts first allowed recovery for emotional distress only when
the plaintiff could make out a cause of action for some already recog-
nized tort, usually involving physical injury.8 These "parasitic ' emo-
tional injury cases reflected a judgment that while the subjectivity of
emotional distress damages might encourage false, trivial, and imag-
ined claims, emotional distress was likely to be real and substantial
when it resulted from a physical injury.'" The physical injury require-
ment eventually withered, and emotional distress damages have be-
come widely available as an element of consequential damages in any
"distinct and independent tort," including purely economic torts.11 In
such cases, plaintiffs can recover even for minor or fleeting distress so
longoas the "host" injury is substantial.'2
2. Intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").
The creation of the intentional infliction tort in the early 1950s
enabled plaintiffs to recover for emotional distress absent any other
injury." The intentional infliction tort reflects courts' desire to broaden
liability while confining emotional distress recovery to cases where
plaintiff will likely have real and severe distress. In IIED, the defen-
dant's intent to cause distress serves as an evidentiary proxy for the
7 Clohessy, 675 A2d at 860.
8 See Levit, 61 Geo Wash L Rev at 142 (cited in note 4) (discussing history of parasitic
damage rule); John H. Bauman, Emotional Distress Damages and the Tort of Insurance Bad
Faith, 46 Drake L Rev 717,722 (1998) (same).
9 Payton v Abbott Labs, 386 Mass 540,437 NE2d 171, 176 (1982) (discussing historical de-
velopment of emotional distress liability that began with parasitic claims).
10 See id (discussing policies behind parasitic recovery cases). See also William Landes and
Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 245 (Harvard 1987) (discussing the effi-
ciency of allowing emotional distress damages only when accompanied by physical injury).
11 Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Assoc v United Pacific Insurance Co, 219 F3d 895,903
(9th Cir 2000) (upholding emotional distress award to real estate developers whose insurance
company tortiously denied them liability coverage against suits by disgruntled homeowners).
12 See id at 903-04 (describing California law).
13 See Payton v Abbott Labs, 386 Mass 540,437 NE2d 171,177 (1982) (explaining historical
genesis of recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress absent physical harm). The
American Law Institute recognized lIED as an independent tort in 1965. See Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 46 (1965).
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existence and severity of the distress itself. " Courts limit liability to in-
stances of "extreme and outrageous conduct" that result in "distress
•.. so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure
it."'5 Still, courts do not simply rely on intent to establish the severity
of plaintiffs' distress. The jury must independently determine that
plaintiff has in fact suffered severe distress.'6
3. Negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED").
The NIED tort represents the current wave of expansion and un-
certainty in emotional distress liability. Most jurisdictions allow recov-
ery in at least some categories of cases where defendant's lack of care
causes nothing but emotional injury.'7 But if given its fullest possible
scope, NIED would allow plaintiffs to have a cause of action when-
ever defendant fails to take reasonable care to avoid causing emo-
tional injury." Because such a broad duty would seem to invite an ava-
lanche of litigation composed largely of nonmeritorious claims, most
courts limit recovery to cases with either physical or contextual prox-
ies for severity.'9 However, "the modern judicial trend is to abolish the
physical manifestation requirement and permit a general negligence
cause of action for the infliction of serious emotional distress without
regard to whether the plaintiff suffered any physical injury as a re-
sult.
, ,20
14 See, for example, Wilkes v Young, 28 F3d 1362, 1366 (4th Cir 1994) (describing common
law requirements of lIED); Wilkinson v Downton, 2 QB 61 (1897) (finding defendant liable
when he falsely told plaintiff that her husband had been badly injured).
15 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt j. For example, in one early case, defendant
tricked plaintiff into thinking that her hospitalized spouse had died. Id at ill 1.
16 See, for example, Wilkes, 28 F3d at 1366 (describing requirement that jury find presence
of severe distress).
17 See Payton v Abbott Labs, 386 Mass 540, 437 NE2d 171,177 (1982) (noting allowance by
most courts of recovery for emotional distress when plaintiff was in "zone of danger"); Bauman,
46 Drake L Rev at 725-26 (cited innote 8) (explaining expansion and retraction of available re-
covery for emotional distress without physical harm).
18 See Payton, 437 NE2d at 174-75 (explaining dangers of broad NIED actions).
19 See Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends Regarding the Physical Injury Requirement
in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and "Fear of Disease" Cases, 28 Tort & Ins L J 1, 1-2
(1992) (surveying jurisdictions and concluding that an "ebbing majority" requires some physical
injury or symptom to maintain an NIED action).
20 Id at 4. See, for example, St Elizabeth Hospital v Garrard, 730 SW2d 649,654 (Tex 1987)
("[P]roof of physical injury resulting from mental anguish is no longer an element of the com-
mon law action for negligent infliction of mental anguish."); Gates v Richardson, 719 P2d 193,
200 (Wyo 1986) (electing not to require that physical harm accompany emotional harm in per-
mitting recovery by mother and siblings who witnessed accident that left child comatose). At
least one other jurisdiction (Massachusetts) appears poised to abandon the physical injury re-
quirement. See Kathryn E. Hand and Patricia L. Kelly, Massachusetts Tort Law Manual § 6.1.1(3)
(Mass CLE 2000) (discussing signs that Supreme Judicial Court might abandon physical injury
requirement).
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Moreover, most jurisdictions have carved out certain categories
where recovery can be had despite a lack of physical manifestation
because the cause of the injury seems likely to result in severe distress.
A "strong majority" of courts allow NIED claims without any physical
manifestation in "zone of danger" cases, where the defendant's care-
lessness comes close to physically hurting plaintiff, but in fact does
not.2' More recently, an increasing number of courts have allowed "by-
stander" recovery,22 where plaintiff witnesses serious physical injury in-
flicted upon a third party as a result of defendant's negligence, but
does not suffer any injury himself.23 The limits of bystander liability
remain unclear, with courts reaching differing conclusions on how
closely related the NIED plaintiff must be to the third-party victim,
24
and whether the plaintiff must visually and contemporaneously per-
ceive the third-party injury."
B. The Mitigation Doctrine
This Part discusses the doctrinal features and policy motivations
of the mitigation rule. Mitigation doctrine prevents a plaintiff from re-
21 Consolidated Rail Corp v Gottshall, 512 US 532,547-48 (1994) (adopting zone of danger
test for NIED claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act without any physical manifesta-
tion requirement); Payton, 437 NE2d at 177 (asserting that, by 1965, the "strong majority" of
American courts had adopted the zone of danger rule).
22 This category of NIED cases began with the watershed case of Dillon v Legg, 68 Cal 2d
728, 441 P2d 912, 920-21 (1968) (allowing mother to recover for distress caused by seeing child
run over by car, although mother was never in any physical danger). The California Supreme
Court subsequently narrowed Dillon's amorphous "forseeability" standard of liability in Thing v
La Chusa, 48 Cal 3d 644, 771 P2d 814, 826 (1989) (concluding that a simple "forseeability" stan-
dard "provides virtually no limit on liability for nonphysical harm").
23 See Patrick EX. Santel, Comment, Bystanders' Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Claims in Washington State: Must You Be Present to Win?, 23 Seattle U L Rev 769,779-81 (2000)
(surveying jurisdictions and finding that nearly half of American states allow recovery for by-
standers who were never themselves imperiled).
24 Many courts only allow recovery for members of victim's immediate family. See, for ex-
ample, Trombetta v Conkling, 593 NYS2d 670,671 (App Div 1993) (imposing "immediate family"
requirement to deny recovery to victim's niece so as not to "unreasonably extend the limits of
defendants' duty" of care), affd 605 NYS2d 678, 626 NE2d 653 (NY 1993). But see Dunphy v
Gregor, 136 NJ 99,642 A2d 372,380 (1994) (extending recovery to cohabitant fianc6e of accident
victim because relationship constituted "[a]n intimate familial relationship"). A few states may
not require any familial or intimate relationship at all. See, for example, Paugh v Hanks, 6 Ohio
St 3d 72, 451 NE 2d 759, 766-67 (Ohio 1983) (refusing to define how closely related a plaintiff
must be to a victim to sustain an emotional distress claim).
25 Compare Hegel v McMahon, 136 Wash 2d 122,960 P2d 424,429 (1998) (allowing family
member to recover when he sees physically injured family member "shortly after [the accident]
and before there is substantial change in the [victim's] condition or location"), and Masaki v
General Motors Corp, 71 Hawaii 1,780 P2d 566,576 (1989) (announcing Hawaii's "same island"
rule and allowing a son to recover for emotional distress when the son resided on the same is-
land as his father and saw his father in the hospital after an accident), with Fineran v Pickett, 465
NW2d 662,663-64 (Iowa 1991) (refusing to allow recovery for parents and siblings who arrived
at daughter's injury scene two minutes after she had been hit by car).
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covering the portion of his damages that he could have prevented by
taking reasonable care after having suffered his injury. It reduces the
moral hazard created by tort insurance, whereby plaintiff has reduced
incentives to take efficient post-injury care because, absent a mitiga-
tion rule, the benefits of such care would accrue to the tortfeasor, who
serves as the plaintiff's insurer within the context of the action. This
Part shows that while courts apply mitigation throughout torts, and
indeed in all damage actions, they have not extended the mitigation
principle to emotional distress injuries.
1. General aspects of the doctrine.
Under the mitigation rule, an injured party cannot recover for
damages that he could have reduced or prevented by exercising rea-
sonable care after sustaining his injury." The defendant must reim-
burse the plaintiff for all reasonable expenses incurred in attempting
to mitigate his damages, regardless of whether plaintiff's efforts suc-
ceed." Mitigation differs from doctrines like the "eggshell-skull" rule
and contributory negligence because it comes into play once a defen-
dant's liability has been established and only calls into question the
appropriate amount of damages.8 Mitigation deals only with the plain-
tiff's conduct after his cause of action accrues and the defendant
pleads it as an affirmative defense for which he carries the burden of
proof.29
A plaintiff satisfies the mitigation rule by taking the steps that an
ordinary, reasonable person would take in the same circumstances. In
26 See Jackson v City of Kansas, 263 Kan 143,947 P2d 31,36 (1997) ("The law does not pe-
nalize [plaintiffs] inaction; it merely does nothing to compensate him for the harm that a rea-
sonable man in his place would have avoided."), quoting with approval, Theis v duPont, Glore
Forgan Inc, 212 Kan 301,510 P2d 1212,1217-18 (1973).
27 See ECDC Environmental, LC v New York Marine and General Insurance Co, 1999 US
Dist LEXIS 15268, *6-7 (S D NY) ("[Plaintiff] was not required to take extraordinary measures
to mitigate damages, or even to take measures which in hindsight might have been more success-
ful ... as long as [plaintiffs] efforts were reasonable, the cost associated with [plaintiffs] efforts
is reimbursable.").
28 The eggshell skull rule applies to the plaintiffs preexisting physical condition. See Munn
v Algee, 924 F2d 568, 576 (5th Cir 1991). Contributory negligence applies to the plaintiffs con-
duct leading up to the injury. See Munn v Southern Health Plan, 719 F Supp 525, 527 (N D Miss
1989).
29 Courts and commentators commonly, but inaccurately, describe mitigation as a "legal
obligation," see, for example, Marvin A. Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of
Contracts 153 (Foundation 3d ed 1998), or a "duty" that the law "imposes" upon the plaintiff, see,
for example, Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 17.7 (Aspen 1999). However, mitigation is not a legal
duty, since its neglect "does not create a right of action in any other person." W.E. Shipley, Anno-
tation, Duty of Injured Person to Submit to Nonsurgical Medical Treatment to Minimize Tort
Damages, 62 ALR 3d 70 § 3 n 29 (1975). " [T~he doctrine of avoidable consequences" may be the
superior term, see Jackson, 947 P2d at 36 (supporting "avoidable consequences" terminology), al-
though "duty to mitigate" appears to be more widely used.
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the context of negligence, Judge Learned Hand defined a reasonable
precaution as one whose cost is less than or equal to the expected cost
of the accident." In theory, this definition works as well for mitigation
as for liability.3 However, hard cases cannot be reduced to an alge-
braic formula, especially when the "care" involves risking one's life
rather than taking a simple precaution such as installing safety devices.
For example, a surgical procedure could have a positive expected
value, but still have a 10 percent chance of killing the plaintiff-
patient.32 Indeed, for a risk-averse plaintiff, this medical procedure
would not be worthwhile. Courts hold that it is ipso facto reasonable
for plaintiffs to refuse treatments that would meet the Hand test if
they create "peril to life, however slight, and undue risks to health, and
anguish that goes beyond the bounds of reason."3
2. Reducing moral hazard-the policy informing the
mitigation doctrine.
The mitigation doctrine tries to curb ex post moral hazard-the
tendency of people with insurance to suffer greater losses than the un-
insured."4 The concept translates directly to lawsuits, for when a defen-
dant becomes legally liable for the plaintiff's injuries, he effectively
becomes the plaintiff's insurer in the context of the action." Thus,
without a mitigation rule, plaintiffs would have a perverse incentive to
sit back and let their damages mount, even though they could stanch
16the loss by exercising reasonable care. As a result, plaintiffs would be
overcompensated in the absence of a mitigation rule: they would re-
ceive more in damages than they would ex ante wish to purchase as
insurance for the same injury. The greater the ex post control the in-
sured can exercise over the amount of loss, the greater the moral haz-
30 See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169,172 (2d Cir 1947).
31 See Goetz and Scott, 69 Va L Rev at 973-74 (cited in note 2) (developing joint-cost
minimizing model of avoidable consequences rule in contractual breach context).
32 See Epstein, Torts § 17.7 at 448 (cited in note 29).
33 See, for example, Cannon v New Jersey Bell Telephone, 219 NJ Super 304,530 A2d 345,
350-52 (NJ Super App Div 1987) (holding reasonable as a matter of law plaintiff's decision not
to undergo doctor recommended urethral surgery to remove blockage that had 93 percent
chance of success but also had up to 15 percent chance of rendering plaintiff impotent), quoting
Budden v Goldstein, 43 NJ Super 340, 128 A2d 730 (NJ Super App Div 1957).
34 See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex L Rev 237, 238-39 (1996)
(defining and describing moral hazard).
35 See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L J
1521, 1553 (1987) ("[V]ictim moral hazard is as serious a problem in a third-party [tort] context
as in a first-party context. Preferences for extra visits to the doctor, prolonged hospitalization, or
more advanced forms of medical treatment do not diminish because the source of the injury is a
third-party defendant.").
36 See id at 1547.
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ard.37 The mitigation rule, by forcing plaintiffs to act as if their losses
were not insured, "encourage[s] plaintiffs to reduce the societal costs
of their injuries." So a properly functioning mitigation rule mimics a
situation in which the plaintiff owns his full loss; mitigation makes
plaintiffs internalize the costs of their post-injury conduct.
Nineteenth-century insurers coined the phrase "moral hazard, ' ' 9
and the insurance market remains the best place to study the problem
and its possible solutions. Ideally, an insurer would contractually con-
dition reimbursement on the exercise of care by the insured. However,
moral hazard problems become particularly acute when the insurer
cannot observe care at all or cannot do so efficiently.* Insurers re-
spond to the unobservability problem by offering only partial cover-
age or no coverage at all, or by raising premiums. First-party insur-
ance also relies on deductibles and copayments to reduce moral haz-
ard. 2 Deductibles and copayments force claimants to pay either a
fixed sum or a percentage of their loss. All these strategies reduce
available coverage, because when recovery cannot be conditioned on
care, moral hazard can only be reduced or avoided by giving the in-
sured a direct stake in the size of his loss.
3. The universal application of the mitigation rule.
The important economic function of the mitigation doctrine ex-
plains its complete acceptance by courts and uniformly favorable
41treatment by scholars. It is the "universal common law rule" in torts,
41
and applies with equal vigor in contract" and statutory actions.
Courts apply it to legislatively created causes of action, such as anti-
37 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am
Econ Rev 941, 961 (1963) (explaining that moral hazard arises when the insured can have some
control over his amount of loss, and giving example of reluctance to use medical services after an
injury).
38 Munn v Algee, 924 F2d 568,576-77 n 16 (5th Cir 1991).
39 Baker, 75 Tex L Rev at 250-52 (cited in note 34) (recounting the genesis of the term
"moral hazard").
40 See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q J Econ 541,544-50 (model-
ing insurance market when insurer is not able to observe the behavior of the insured).
41 See id at 546 (arguing that optimal level of coverage under conditions of asymmetric in-
formation is always positive).
42 See Priest, 96 Yale L J at 1548 (cited in note 35) (explaining internal mechanisms for re-
duction of moral hazard in the market insurance context).
43 Epstein, Torts at § 17.7 (cited in note 29).
44 See Goetz and Scott, 69 Va L Rev at 967 (cited in note 2) ("The duty to mitigate is a
universally accepted principle of contract law.").
45 See, for example, Roger D. Colton and Doug Smith, The Duty of a Public Utility To Miti-
gate "Damages" from Nonpayment through the Offer of Conservation Programs, 3 BU Pub Int L
J 239, 248-49 (1993) ("There are few principles in the law of remedies as well established as that
of a claimant's duty of mitigation.").
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trust,4 takings, and environmental law.4 Indeed, with only one narrow
set of exceptions, "[t]he principle of 'avoidable consequences' . .. finds
its application in virtually every type of case in which the recovery of a
money judgment or award is authorized. '9
C. Never the Twain Shall Meet?
Despite the ubiquitous use of mitigation in determining damages,
courts have neglected to apply the rule to emotional distress."4 The
question of whether a plaintiff failed to mitigate emotional distress
damages has only been discussed in roughly a dozen or so reported
decisions."' No court has created an explicit affirmative exception for
46 See, for example, Young v Whidbey Island Board of Realtors, 96 Wash 2d 729, 638 P2d
1235,1237-38 (1982) (en banc) (holding that mitigation rules govern damages under the state's
Unfair Business Practices Act, even though such suits are "largely divorced from [their] original
grounding in the law of torts").
47 See State v Pahl, 254 Minn 349, 95 NW2d 81, 91 (1959) (applying mitigation rule to
owner of condemned house).
48 Intel Corp v Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co, 692 F Supp 1171,1191 (N D Cal 1989),
revd in part on other grounds, 952 F2d 1551 (9th Cir 1991) (applying duty to mitigate in cases in-
volving cleanup of hazardous waste).
49 Kelley v Chicago Park District, 409 I11 91, 98 NE2d 738, 742 (1951), quoting with ap-
proval, Dresskell v City of Miami, 153 Fla 90, 13 S2d 707,709 (1943) (holding that mitigation for
wrongful termination applies not only to contractual employment, but also to public officials
whose employment terms are determined by law).
50 This Comment deals only with mitigating emotional distress damages themselves. When
a tortiously created situation creates a variety of injuries, and the plaintiff has it in his power to
remedy the underlying source of his physical, economic, and emotional injuries but refuses to do
so, the defense of mitigation will be available. But this issue is distinct from-and easier than-
mitigation directed at the amount of emotional distress itself. See, for example, Rogan v Lewis,
975 F Supp 956,966 n 14 (S D Tex 1997) ("Had plaintiff pursued an appeal [for reinstatement as
a teacher] with the Texas Education Agency, she might have been able to mitigate some or all of
her emotional distress damages that may flow from the due process deprivation."); Chuy v
Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F Supp 254,257,263-64 n 15 (E D Pa 1977) (upholding a
jury instruction on mitigation in an intentional infliction case brought by an athlete who saw on
television the team doctor erroneously claim that he had a life threatening disease, and who as a
result experienced a six-month "period of extreme emotional anguish and torment during which
he anticipated his death," yet failed to take tests to find out whether he really had the condition),
affd 595 F2d 1265, 1276 (3d Cir 1979) (en banc).
51 A significant number of these cases avoid any substantive discussion of the mitigation is-
sue by finding that plaintiff's emotional distress made him too upset to be able to mitigate his
distress. See Botek v Mine Safety Appliance Corp, 531 Pa 160,611 A2d 1174, 1177 n 2 (1992) ("It
is clear that where a claimant's rejection of [psychiatric] treatment is part of his emotional inju-
ries, he may recover damages in spite of his failure to receive treatment."); Cannon v New Jersey
Bell Telephone, 219 NJ Super 304, 530 A2d 345, 351-52 (NJ Super App Div 1987) (holding that
teenage boy, suffering possibly permanent urethral damage after colliding with defendant's dan-
gling telephone wire, who refused psychiatric counseling recommended by his doctor "should
not be precluded from recovering full damages because of a psychological state which led him to
reject any needed counseling"), citing with approval, Feld v Merriam, 314 Pa Super 414,461 A2d
225, 234 n 12 (1983) (holding that plaintiff is not "precluded from recovering compensatory
damages" although he did not mitigate damages by undergoing psychiatric counseling because
his "general rejection of psychiatric treatment is a manifestation of his emotional injuries"), revd
on other grounds, 506 Pa 383,485 A2d 742 (1984). Still, these cases seem to acknowledge that an
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emotional distress, but a de facto exception seems to obtain.2 Com-
mentators appear to have wholly ignored the issue. The lack of author-
ity and analysis results in large differences in how these few decisions
treat the mitigation defense. Only two obscure cases, both in local trial
courts, have reduced a plaintiffs recovery for refusing to mitigate
emotional distress damages." On the other hand, at least one court
seems to think that emotional distress might be exempt from the miti-
gation rule,4 though no court has actually held that mitigation does
not apply. Two other cases suggest that mitigation might be applicable
to emotional distress, but refuse to establish a "reasonableness" test
based on seeking psychiatric treatment.
II. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS LIABILITY WITHOUT A MITIGATION RULE
RESULTS IN SYSTEMATIC OVERCOMPENSATION
From a policy perspective, the mitigation rule should only apply
to emotional distress liability if two conditions are satisfied: (1) emo-
tional distress liability must create the moral hazard problems com-
mon to all other forms of tort liability; and (2) the mitigation rule
emotional distress award could be reduced for failure to mitigate in the proper circumstances.
52 The reporters contain only one (very recent) case where the mitigation question has
reached a jury. See Musa v Jefferson County Bank, 233 Wis 2d 241,607 NW2d 349, 352 n 7 (Wis
Ct App 2000) (describing jury instruction on "duty to mitigate damages for emotional distress,"
which tells jury that injured plaintiff must use ordinary care in seeking and submitting to "medi-
cal treatment"), pet for rev granted, 237 Wis 2d 251, 616 NW2d 114 (2000). See also Salas v
United States, 974 F Supp 202, 211 (W D NY 1997) (noting the court could only locate a single
case that "address[es] the duty to mitigate damages where the plaintiffs injury is psychiatric in
nature").
53 Both cases involved plaintiffs who refused psychiatric attention and medication to treat
their distress, against the advice of their attending physicians. See Tucker v Town of Branford,
1998 Conn Super LEXIS 1139, *14-15,22-23 (plaintiff, who suffered "severe shock to her nerv-
ous system" as result of a minor auto accident, but who refused doctor recommended medication
therapy that would have cured her within six months, could only recover for six months of dis-
tress); Skaria v New York, 110 Misc 2d 711,442 NYS2d 838,842 n 1 (NY Ct Cl 1981) (holding, in
landlord liability suit, that rape victim failed to mitigate her emotional distress by not seeking
treatment for distress, and finding unreasonable plaintiffs "excuse" of wanting to "conceal her
rape"). These two opinions assume, without any analysis, that mitigation applies to emotional dis-
tress as surely as it does to any other damages. See Tucker, 1998 Conn Super LEXIS 1139 at *22-
23 (applying mitigation doctrine when plaintiff refused to seek psychiatric treatment); Skaria,
442 NYS2d at 842 ("[C]laimants are bound by the proposition of law that an injured plaintiff has
an affirmative duty to mitigate damages.").
54 See Zerilli v New York City Transit Authority, 973 F Supp 311,323 (E D NY 1997) (sug-
gesting in dicta that there is "no authority" to support a mitigation defense for emotional distress
damages). See also Whaley, 26 Suffolk U L Rev at 951 n 73 (cited in note 3) (mentioning in pass-
ing that "mitigation [is] impossible" for emotional distress injuries).
55 See Baker v Dorfman, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 4451, *17 (S D NY) (holding that plaintiffs
"desire not to take medication, standing alone, does not support [defendant's] argument" that
plaintiff did not mitigate his distress), affd on other grounds, 2000 US App LEXIS 22798 (2d
Cir); Dohman v Richard, 282 S2d 789,793-94 (La App 1973) (holding that requirement of miti-
gation of emotional injuries does not extend to doctor recommended "psychiatric therapy" in the
form of electroshock).
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must solve the moral hazard problem. This Part begins by considering
"incommensurability" arguments that might suggest moral hazard
would not arise in emotional injuries. It explains that while money
may not replace injured emotions, it can substitute for them, and thus
may make plaintiffs indifferent, ex ante, between distress and some
amount of damages. Moral hazard exists for emotional distress liabil-
ity and may be quite high in some situations. This Part goes on to ex-
amine whether private incentives reduce the moral hazard and make
legal intervention less necessary.
A. Why Moral Hazard Exists for Emotional Injuries
In general, not having a mitigation requirement results in exces-
sive compensation from an ex ante perspective-that is, more com-
pensation than the insureds would be willing to pay for if they were to
contract for it in advance.16 Emotional distress liability will create
moral hazard because the "insured" victim can exercise some degree
of control over the ex post size of the injury -a defining condition of
moral hazard. Given that there is no ceiling on common law tort re-
covery, emotional distress victims "would have an incentive to exacer-
bate the extent of their damages in order to recover more than their
actual losses-the ex post species of moral hazard." 7 Victims might be
able to control their degree of distress in numerous ways, from medi-
cation to keeping a "stiff upper lip.'", Thus most legal economists be-
lieve that there is no reason moral hazard would vanish when the in-
sured loss is emotional, and attribute the lack of first-party insurance
for nonpecuniary injuries in general to severe moral hazard prob-
lems.9
Indeed, emotional distress may create more moral hazard than
other injuries. Moral hazard is a problem of "hidden action," based on
the difficulty of monitoring the victim's level of care6 Most courts do
56 See Priest, 96 Yale L J at 1547 (cited in note 35) (arguing that ex post moral hazard cre-
ated by insurance for nonpecuniary loss results in higher compensation than victims would wish
to purchase in advance).
57 Croley and Hanson, 108 Harv L Rev at 1849 (cited at note 3). There is also another type
of moral hazard, ex ante moral hazard, where a person values emotional stability at less than the
likely legal compensation. See id. This Comment does not consider those problems because they
would not be addressed by any mitigation rule.
58 See Part III.B. The amount of control victims have will likely vary depending on the na-
ture and cause of the distress.
59 See, for example, Croley and Hanson, 108 Harv L Rev at 1848-51 (cited in note 3) (as-
cribing lack of nonpecuniary loss insurance to difficulties in evaluating the severity of the loss);
Priest, 96 Yale L J at 1547, 1553 (cited in note 35) (discussing the existence of a moral hazard
given insurance for pain and suffering, and considering this as possible explanation for the fact
that insurance companies do not write policies for nonpecuniary losses).
60 See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the
Law 153 (Harvard 1994) (describing the "hidden action problem" of moral hazard). Hidden ac-
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not require any medical or psychiatric evidence to establish an emo-
tional distress claim, allowing the jury to base its determination solely
on plaintiffs testimony about his subjective state.' Because emotional
distress takes place entirely within the plaintiff's mind, it could be dif-
ficult to observe or verify whether he took appropriate ex post care.
B. Incommensurability?
It may seem counterintuitive that a plaintiff would, in the absence
of a mitigation rule, willingly forgo opportunities to reduce his own
suffering. But mitigation always entails some cost, and the costlier the
mitigation, the greater the moral hazard.63 Even small efforts like visit-
ing a doctor have positive costs, even if only the opportunity costs of
time, like sitting in a doctor's waiting room. Why undertake costly ac-
tions whose financial benefits will be captured by the defendant? Fur-
thermore, people may have strong idiosyncratic preferences. For ex-
ample, plaintiffs might refuse medical care out of religious scruple" or
a distrust of doctors.
However, the mitigation rule assumes that the extra emotional
distress created by not mitigating can actually be made good through
monetary compensation.65 The "incommensurability" theory holds that
money may compensate for emotional injury, but not fully. Thus an
award equal to the "value" of plaintiff's distress might make him less
than 100 percent whole. Of course, this slippage would likely vary in
degree across types and severity of emotional distress. At most, such a
"partial incommensurabilty" argument calls into question the degree
tion problems can become so severe as to cause first-party insurers to withdraw coverage. See
Baker, 75 Tex L Rev at 253 (cited in note 34) (noting that "refusal to insure" was the "first re-
sort" of nineteenth-century insurers for types of coverage likely to create moral hazard); Mark V.
Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 Am Econ Rev 531, 535 n 3 (1968) (sug-
gesting moral hazard "as an explanation of why certain types of expenses are not insured com-
mercially"). But see Shavell, 93 0 J Econ at 546-50 (cited in note 40) (demonstrating a model
where some level of insurance will be offered despite total inability to observe conduct of in-
sured).
61 See Miller v Willbanks, 8 SW3d 607, 613 (Tenn 1999) (adopting "majority approach" of
allowing jury to find severe emotional distress based on subjective testimony alone); Rodriguez v
Consolidation Coal Co, 206 W Va 317, 524 SE2d 672, 681 (1999) (holding that jury could find
NIED based on plaintiff's testimony about his emotional state).
62 See Croley and Hanson, 108 Harv L Rev at 1850 (cited in note 3) (recognizing problems
of proof for ex post emotional injuries).
63 For a mathematical demonstration, see Shavell, 93 Q J Econ at 546-49 (cited in note 40)("[T]he level of [efficient] coverage approaches full coverage as the cost of taking care tends to
zero.").
64 See, for example, Munn v Algee, 924 F2d 568, 574 (5th Cir 1991) (holding decedent's re-
fusal to accept life-saving blood transfusion because of Jehovah's Witness beliefs to be unreason-
able failure to mitigate).
65 Indeed the common law system of remedies is built on the assumption that money com-
pensates for loss.
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of moral hazard in emotional distress liability, not its existence. In ef-
fect, "partial incommensurability" serves the function of an insurance
copayment,6 whereby the insured bears part of the cost of his injury.
Copayments limit moral hazard, but unless the copayment is 100 per-
cent, it cannot eliminate it.6 Thus, even if, as the incommensurability
thesis would suggest, people have private incentives to take every rea-
sonable measure to reduce their emotional distress, the mitigation
principle still would play an important role in establishing the proper
level of damages. 6
Moral hazard, like most microeconomic theories, is based on the
idea of substitutability.9 People derive utility from a combination of
things, such as physical health, economic prosperity, and emotional
tranquility. One can maintain one's original level of utility after losing
some of any of these elements by gaining more of some other element.
Emotional distress may be incommensurable with money in the sense
of replacement value: perhaps the damages award will not allow one to
actually "buy back" one's previous emotional state." However, emo-
tional distress damages can have a substitution value equal to the in-
jury-that is, they return plaintiff to his original indifference curve.
66 See Part IV.A.1 (discussing role of copayments in controlling moral hazard).
67 For example, a plaintiff's.expected recovery is reduced by attorney's fees, and the likeli-
hood that the case will settle for a sum less than the highest possible value of the claim. See
Priest, 96 Yale L J at 1556 (cited in note 35). The costs of obtaining compensation through the le-
gal system serve as a copayment or deductible mechanism for tort insurance, which might reduce
the moral hazard but not eliminate it. These costs do not seem to reduce moral hazard signifi-
cantly. These same costs, or their analogues, exist in the first-party insurance system, where the
insurer does not pay on all claims and often negotiates to pay a sum less than what the claimant
originally demanded. See id. However, despite these costs that might control moral hazard, first-
party insurance does not cover emotional injuries, largely because of moral hazard. See id at
1553; Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan, and James F Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in
Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw U L Rev 908,933-34 (1989) (describing how moral
hazard prevents first-party insurers from writing policies to cover any intangible harms).
68 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779,796
(1994) ("Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single
metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best
characterized."). Incommensurability could argue against compensation for emotional injuries. If
defendants must pay money that fails to make good plaintiffs' emotional injuries, and the cost of
this liability will be reflected in the higher cost of products or services, then people are being
forced to cross-subsidize insurance that the plaintiffs would not choose to purchase ex ante. See
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L J 353,
362-77 (1988).
69 The merits of this and other fundamental economic assumptions (like rational actors)
that underpin moral hazard are beyond the scope of this Comment.
70 Yet money may help improve future emotional states, if spent in ways that bring com-
fort, peace of mind, or joy.
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C. Moral Hazard in Various Emotional Distress Contexts Absent a
Mitigation Rule
In the absence of a mitigation rule, the severity of moral hazard
varies across different legal categories of emotional distress liability.7'
This discussion assumes that given a level of emotional distress dam-
ages (D) caused by an injury, plaintiffs failure to mitigate results in a
level of unmitigated distress ( D') at least as high as the original level
of distress. In deciding whether or not to mitigate, plaintiff chooses be-
tween two damage levels: D (which is constant) and D' (whose value
plaintiff controls), with D' greater than or equal to D. The level of
moral hazard equals D' - D.
A crucial aspect of moral hazard absent a mitigation rule is the
effect of plaintiff's level of distress on the probability of success at trial
(p).72 It is important to remember that failing to mitigate is not the
same thing as feigning distress: when an injured plaintiff fails to miti-
gate his distress, his subjective level of emotional injuries may actually
increase. Thus in the absence of a mitigation rule, a properly instructed
jury would treat D' as the actual consequence of defendant's wrong-
doing and grant full recovery.
1. Moral hazard in consequential damage cases.
A plaintiff can recover for emotional distress, no matter how
slight or fleeting, when it stems from an independent, non-emotional
tort.73 This suggests that when plaintiff's initial level of emotional dis-
tress, D, is zero (or very small), he has a relatively strong incentive not
to mitigate and allow D' to increase. Because of the diminishing mar-
ginal costs to litigation, the cost of adding the nth damages claim to a
tort suit that would be filed anyway is relatively small in relation to
the cost of the litigation. Thus the move from D = 0 to D' > 0 will
likely increase the expected value of the suit, because the increase in
expected recovery will exceed the marginal cost of adding the distress
claim to a complaint.
To be sure, most physical injury torts, a subset of consequential
distress cases, will be handled by contingency-fee attorneys," so in
71 See Part II.A.
72 Some models suggest that p will likely be greater than 0.5 in litigated emotional distress
cases. See Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
22 J Legal Stud 187, 188 (1993). Where one party has an informational advantage, that party
should have a high win rate at trial. See id at 199. In emotional distress cases, the plaintiff has an
informational advantage with respect to a crucial element of the case-the effects of defendant's
actions. Where the plaintiff's level of care influences the size of the injury, the plaintiff also has
an informational advantage. See id at 202.
73 See text accompanying notes 4-13.
74 See Samuel R. Gross and Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
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such cases the plaintiff does not directly face the marginal cost condi-
tion. However, the attorney must still take into account the costs of
litigation. Thus the plaintiff's failure to mitigate may determine
whether an attorney accepts the case in the first place.75 If plaintiff's fail-
ure to mitigate when D = 0 (or very small) increases the value of the
total claim by more than the (small) marginal cost borne by the attor-
ney for adding the claim to the tort suit, the representation will be-
come more attractive to the attorney ex ante.
When D > 0, the private incentives not to mitigate diminish rela-
tive to D = 0, but certainly do not disappear. The moral hazard should
remain constant for all D > 0. As a doctrinal matter, the size of D'
should not affect the probability of establishing liability at trial. At
most, it could affect the probability of recovering any given level of
emotional distress damages themselves or the bargaining range for
settlement. Thus p should stay constant across all positive levels of
emotional distress.
2. Intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The law requires that a plaintiff have severe emotional distress
for him to prevail on an intentional infliction claim." Thus severity
does not just determine the amount of damages, it determines whether
plaintiff has a cause of action. Severity is a jury question. In the ab-
sence of a mitigation rule, the severity requirement exacerbates moral
hazard, especially when the initial D is near the severity threshold.
The severity rule creates a tipping effect: on one side of the line,
plaintiffs get full recovery; on the other side, none. Thus plaintiffs near
this threshold will have strong incentives to let their damages mount
at least until the point where they think they are -comfortably inside
the severity zone.77 Once D' rises above what plaintiff believes to be
the severity cutoff, his incentives become those of the consequential
damages plaintiff discussed above. This suggests that moral hazard will
be most acute at different levels of D in IIED than in consequential
cases-low levels for consequential damages and levels around the se-
verity threshold for IIED. Furthermore, since IIED can be an inde-
pendent tort, there are no economies to litigation when it is the plain-
tiff's sole cause of action. The marginal cost of bringing the distress
Geared to Settlements, 44 UCLA L Rev 1, 15-18 (1996) (presenting empirical evidence that "con-
tingent fees are essentially the only mode of payment in personal injury cases").
75 See Jonathan T. Molot, How US. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 Ind L J 59,
82-85 (1997) (discussing attorney incentives in choosing cases under contingent fees).
76 See Miller v Willbanks, 8 SW3d 607, 612-13 (Tenn 1999) (explaining requirement that
plaintiff have severe distress). See also Part I.A.2.
77 Because "severity" is not an objective cutoff but a vague standard, even plaintiffs with
only colorably severe injuries might not be sure if they are within the recovery zone.
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claim equals the total cost of the litigation. This takes away the extra
incentive faced by consequential distress plaintiffs to not mitigate.
3. Negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In the absence of a mitigation rule, the recent judicial movement
in NIED cases from rule-bound, categorical proxies for severity to a
subjective severity standard might exacerbate moral hazard problems.
The categorical approach to NIED liability allows plaintiffs to recover
only if their injury falls into predetermined classes of cases that the
courts have deemed likely to result in real and severe distress.8 Thus
the categorical approach limits moral hazard in an obvious way: if a
plaintiff does not fall into one of the preexisting categories, he will
have no chance of recovering regardless of how high he lets his dam-
ages mount. Thus he will take optimal mitigation measures. In other
words, when there is no insurance, there is no moral hazard. Thus, the
category-based limitations on recovery cabin moral hazard far more
effectively than the open-ended subjective approach.
III. THE DIFFICULTY OF CRAFTING STANDARDS FOR THE
MITIGATION DEFENSE
The de facto exemption of emotional distress from the mitigation
rule creates moral hazard, resulting in systematic overcompensation of
plaintiffs. Applying the mitigation rule would, ideally, be the first re-
sponse to this problem. But developing judicially administrable stan-
dards of reasonableness for mitigation turns out to be much harder
than determining that, in theory, the defense should be available. 9 In-
deed, the difficulty of implementing mitigation in the emotional dis-
tress context may explain why courts have avoided the issue.
This Part assesses psychiatric mitigation and willpower mitiga-
tion, the two most likely paradigms for reasonable mitigation. This
Part finds the former solution unsatisfactory because of concerns
about autonomy, confidentiality, and the possibility that it would
merely replace one form of moral hazard with another. The subjective
and intangible nature of willpower mitigation, on the other hand,
makes it judicially unadministrable.
A. The Medical Analogy-Psychiatric Mitigation
Most of the cases that touch on the issue of mitigating emotional
distress assume that it would involve psychiatric therapy and medica-
78 See Part I.A.3.
79 See Epstein, Torts § 17.7 at 448 (cited in note 29) ("Stating the mitigation principle is
one thing, applying it is another.").
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tion. ° The gravitation towards psychiatric mitigation shown in these
opinions should be no surprise, given that the recent expansion of
emotional distress liability has often been justified by advances in
medical knowledge.8 Furthermore, the psychiatric mitigation standard
suggests itself as an obvious extension of the well-elaborated rules
governing the medical mitigation of physical injuries. However, psy-
chiatric mitigation raises unique problems of autonomy, second-order
moral hazard, and privacy that medical mitigation usually does not.
1. Autonomy.
Plaintiffs with physical injuries cannot unreasonably delay seek-
ing treatment,& and must generally follow their physician's advice."
The reasonableness determination becomes dicey when the proposed
mitigation could itself have extremely unwelcome consequences, al-
though mere discomfort or annoyance must be tolerated."' So while
courts generally find undergoing minor surgery to be reasonable, 
8
mitigation need never entail life-threatening or very painful surgery."'
Furthermore, courts will generally not reduce plaintiffs' recovery for
refusing procedures that could fundamentally alter their lives or per-
80 The only explicit jury instruction on emotional distress mitigation clearly contem-
plates psychiatric mitigation. See Musa v Jefferson County Bank, 233 Wis 2d 241,607 NW2d 349,
352 n 7 (Wis App 2000), pet for rev granted, 237 Wis 2d 251,616 NW2d 114 (2000). See also cases
cited in notes 53-55 and 92-93.
81 See, for example, Corgan v Muehling, 143 I11 2d 296, 574 NE2d 602, 609 (1991) (noting
that the "mental health care field [has] made significant improvements in the diagnosis, descrip-
tion, and treatment of emotional distress"); David J. Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emo-
tional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J Family L 163,190-211 (1977) (describ-
ing medical advances that warrant expanded recognition of independent emotional distress
torts).
82 See, for example, Salas v United States, 974 F Supp 202,211-12 (W D NY 1997) (analo-
gizing to physical injury/medical mitigation precedents in an emotional distress case); Jacobs v
New Orleans Public Service, Inc, 432 S2d 843,846 (La 1983) (applying medical mitigation rules to
emotional distress, but holding that plaintiff was not unreasonable in refusing psychiatric treat-
ment since it would leave her penniless). See also Shipley, Annotation, 62 ALR 3d at 70 § 13
(cited in note 29) (citing as an extension of the medical mitigation rules "the few cases involving
a claim that plaintiff should have submitted to psychiatric treatment to mitigate damages").
83 See Shipley, Annotation, 62 ALR 3d at 70 § 13 (cited in note 29) (discussing plaintiff's
duty to mitigate in cases involving mental and nervous conditions).
84 See Tabieros v Clark Equipment Co, 85 Hawaii 336,944 P2d 1279,1316 (1997) (allowing
jury instruction predicating mitigation on following prescribed course of medical treatment).
85 See Lobermeier v General Telephone Co of Wisconsin, 119 Wis 2d 129, 349 NW2d 466,
477 (Wis 1984). See also text accompanying notes 31-33.
86 See, for example, Troppi v Scarf, 31 Mich App 240, 187 NW2d 511,519 n 11 (1971) (not-
ing willingness to allow surgical procedures only if routine).
87 See Lobermeier, 349 NW2d at 474-75 (holding that plaintiffs need not mitigate physical
injuries if the treatment is hazardous or not "reasonably within [the victim's] means"); Shipley,
Annotation, 62 ALR 3d at 70 § 5 (cited in note 29).
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sonality.8 Some choices are so intimate that the law will not entangle
them with mitigation.
An excellent illustration of the difficulty courts have in dealing
with particularly delicate avenues of mitigation is the new tort of
"wrongful life," where plaintiff becomes pregnant after undergoing a
botched sterilization by defendant physician. In these cases, plaintiff
seeks damages for the cost of giving birth to and raising the unwanted
child. Defendants often argue that plaintiff could have almost fully
mitigated by getting an abortion or putting the unwanted child up for
adoption. Most courts reject this mitigation standard as being overly
invasive." Thus the law attempts to avoid defining reasonableness in a
way that might pressure a plaintiff "to make an unwanted life choice
solely to minimize [defendant's] losses."'
Psychiatric treatment may well be a "life choice" with which
courts would not wish to involve themselves. Antidepressants, anti-
psychotics, and other psychotropic drugs have powerful, and often un-
pleasant, side effects.9' And as the Second Circuit has noted, the effi-
cacy of psychiatric treatment in healing emotional distress remains
controversial." One court in an emotional distress case pointed to the
common Prozac side effects of jumpiness, sleepiness, and confusion as
reasons that a plaintiff could reasonably shy away from such medica-
tion.93 To be sure, in terms of physical discomfort, such side effects
cannot exceed those of the procedures held to be reasonable in physi-
cal injury mitigation. Psychiatric mitigation also differs from other
88 For example, a court has held that as a matter of law, an injured plaintiff does not fail to
mitigate if he refuses an operation that might render him impotent. See Cannon v New Jersey
Bell Telephone, 219 NJ Super 304,530 A2d 345,351 (NJ Super App Div 1987).
89 See Fassoulas v Ramey, 450 S2d 822, 829 (Fla 1984) (suggesting that as a matter of law
requiring abortion or adoption as mitigation is unreasonable); Boone v Mullendore, 416 S2d 718,
723 (Ala 1983) ("[C]ourts ... have rejected the arguments that parents should choose among the
various methods of mitigation-adoption, abortion, etc."); Troppi, 187 NW2d at 520 (holding
that, as a matter of law, "no mother, wed or unwed, can reasonably be required to abort (even if
legal) or place her child up for adoption"). A few jurisdictions have held that reasonable mitiga-
tion does include abortion and adoption. See, for example, Hartke v McKelway, 707 F2d 1544,
1557 n 15 (DC Cir 1981) (citing precedents and academic commentary).
90 See Epstein, Torts § 17.7 at 448 (cited in note 29).
91 See Peter D. Kramer, Listening to Prozac (Viking 1993). See also A Variety of Drugs
Available, Morning Star 1D (Sept 26, 2000) (reporting that side effects of selective serotonin re-
uptake inhibitors include sexual dysfunction in at least 30 percent of patients, and noting possible
connection between Prozac and suicide); Phil Galewitz, Prozac's Reign as Top Drug Ending, As-
sociated Press (Mar 7, 2000) (reporting that some doctors link Prozac to self-destructive and sui-
cidal behavior); David Healy, Good Science or Bad Business?, The Hastings Center Report 19,21
(Mar 1, 2000) (discussing evidence that Prozac might increase suicide rates).
92 See Miner v City of Glens Falls, 999 F2d 655,663 (2d Cir 1993) (holding, in the § 1983
case of a small town policeman fired after he became a Jehovah's Witness and refused to carry a
gun, that "there was no reason to expect that medicines or counseling could dispel the trauma of
losing ... one's professional standing in the community, one's home and one's income").
93 See Salas v United States, 974 F Supp 202,211-12 (W D NY 1997).
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medical mitigation because the side effects express themselves in the
mind and mood of the patient, and thus can be seen as greater usurpa-
tions of autonomy.'
An example of the difficulties in fitting emotional distress into
the standard medical mitigation paradigm arose when a defendant
demanded that plaintiff's emotional distress damages be reduced be-
cause of his refusal to undergo the electroshock treatments his doctor
had strongly recommended." A Louisiana appellate court did not
question the "undoubted value and benefit" of electroshock.% How-
ever, the court expressly set aside the standard medical mitigation
rules, which it believed were inapplicable to "the most misunderstood
field of medicine, i.e., treatment of the mind."97 The court went on to
explain that psychiatric treatment differs from conventional surgery
because it is "designed to work a change on [one's] personality.""' Thus
even if the treatment has a positive expected value, the decision to
undergo it might be one of those life choices-like undergoing an
abortion or risking the loss of a major bodily function-that the law
refuses to investigate or second guess.
2. The problem of the "merry mitigator."
Psychiatric mitigation might also create a second-order moral
hazard problem while attempting to solve the primary one. Standard
mitigation involves actions that no one would undertake in the ab-
sence of a genuine injury. For example, no one undergoes an invasive
surgery just for fun. Yet counseling and medication for emotional
problems, especially antidepressants like Prozac and Zoloft, have an
independent consumption value. People who have not suffered an in-
jury leading to mental distress want these goods and services anyway.9
And, these elective treatments do not come cheap.
94 While some surgical treatments might also involve psychoactive drugs, psychiatric miti-
gation would have a far greater effect on a plaintiffs mental state. Unlike drugs administered in
surgery, whose effects on personality are incidental, antidepressants and their ilk are taken over
a long period of time, and thus have more durable and pronounced effects on the personality.
Indeed, unlike other medications that can affect mood, Prozac and similar drugs are specifically
designed to change the patient's brain chemistry so as to cause substantial changes in his con-
sciousness and day-to-day personality. See David DeGrazia, Prozac, Enhancement, and Self-
creation, 30 Hastings Center Rep 3440 (2000) (discussing the effects of Prozac on one's personal-
ity).
95 See Dohman v Richard, 282 S2d 789, 793 (La App 1973) (holding reasonable plaintiff's
refusal of treatment despite the fact that the doctor vouched that electroshock had as much as a
90 percent chance of improving the plaintiff's condition).
96 Idat794.
97 Id at 793.
98 Id.
99 Millions of people take antidepressants as "cosmetic psychopharmocology" to enhance
social traits or create a sense of well-being rather than to treat abnormal mental states. See
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Because defendants must pay for expenses incurred in mitigation,
the millions of tort victims who desire psychiatric medication for "cos-
metic" purposes could claim to mitigate by using these drugs, and thus
get "free" psychiatric services. Creating a psychiatric mitigation
standard would open new avenues for fraud: plaintiffs might assert
emotional distress damages and claim to fully "mitigate" nonexistent
distress by taking the antidepressants they would want to take anyway.
Of course, defendants could challenge the validity of such supposed
mitigation. Yet defendants might be reluctant do to so. If they pay for
the drugs, the distress claim is resolved. But if they refuse to do so,
they must contest the underlying distress claim, which, since it usually
involves discovery and litigation costs, may be more expensive.
Moreover, emotional distress suits have an extremely high vari-
ance in damage awards. A risk-averse defendant who knows the plain-
tiff's distress is specious might choose to pay the mitigation bill any-
way. The merry mitigator problem resembles the classic moral hazard
problem of "goldbricking," where, for example, physical injury plain-
tiffs undergo a needed surgical procedure in a luxurious hospital suite
on the French Riviera. However, the merry mitigator problem may be
both more severe and harder to police than goldbricking. The primary
difference is that because there is no consumption value in surgery,
few people will submit to it just to get a luxurious hospital suite. How-
ever, millions of people want antidepressants, and under a psychiatric
mitigation standard, they would not have to submit to an unwanted
procedure to get what they desire. This relates to the policing problem.
Goldbricking can be policed because there are obvious objective
grounds on which to distinguish the legitimate "bricks" from the ille-
gitimate "gold." (It is easy in practice to separate French Riviera hos-
pitals from less hospitable ones.) The merry mitigator, on the other
hand, does exactly what a distressed mitigator would do under a psy-
chiatric mitigation standard-take antidepressants. The brick is the
gold.
Kramer, Listening to Prozac at XVII-XVIII (cited in note 91). As a practical matter, such people
have little difficulty getting prescriptions. Moreover, such drugs can now be prescribed for condi-
tions wholly unrelated to mental illness, such as premenstrual syndrome. See Galewitz, Prozac's
Reign as Top Drug Ending, Associated Press (cited in note 91) (reporting that Prozac is widely
used for "simply making people feel good"); Sandra M. Foote and Lynn Etheredge, Increasing
Use of New Prescription Drugs: A Case Study, Health Affairs 165,166 (July-Aug 2000) (describ-
ing antidepressants as fastest growing category of therapeutic drugs, with 120 million prescrip-
tions written in 1988, and citing growing array of non-mental health uses for the drugs as being a
major factor).
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3. Privacy issues make psychiatric mitigation problematic.
When uninsured individuals seek psychiatric treatment, they en-
joy doctor-patient confidentiality. Yet psychiatric treatment as mitiga-
tion would become part of a public record, and could thus be discov-
ered by potential employers, business partners, spouses, and lovers. As
a result, psychiatric mitigation in the tort context imperfectly mimics
the incentives unindemnified people with distress would have to seek
treatment. Having the treatment a matter of public record might have
reputation costs, as well as possibly reducing the effectiveness of the
treatment.' ° Thus, there is reason to think that the costs of psychiatric
mitigation, including secrecy and reputation costs, outweigh any possi-
ble benefits in a large number of cases.
B. Mitigation through Willpower
1. What is "willpower mitigation"?
Those skeptical of the efficacy or legitimacy of psychiatric treat-
ment might favor a different mitigation paradigm-exercising will-
power and self-control. '°' People have some degree of control over
their emotional states.'O Willpower mitigation certainly avoids many of
the problems of psychiatric mitigation. Furthermore, willpower costs
far less than psychiatry.
However, only a couple of decisions appear to endorse a will-
power standard over a psychiatric one. 5 In the principal case, plaintiff
flight attendant suffered emotional distress when his airplane crashed,
leaving him badly burned' The district court's opinion emphasized
plaintiff's sustained efforts to "cope" with his emotional distress, prais-
ing him as "a man of substantial resolve."'"" In particular, the court
noted that he "forced himself' to fly in airplanes again and he took up
100 See Deborah A. Zarin, et al, Characteristics of Health Plans That Treat Psychiatric Pa-
tients, Health Affairs 226, 229 (Sept-Oct 1999) (referencing a study showing that 20 percent of
health plan patients choose to pay for their own psychiatric treatment to protect their confiden-
tiality).
101 See Salas v United States, 974 F Supp 202, 212 (W D NY 1997) (noting the "general be-
lief that drugs cannot alleviate emotional difficulties and that such problems must be overcome
by one's own willpower").
102 An array of everyday idioms suggests the wide acceptance of the willpower perspective:
not wallowing in one's misery, cheering oneself up, accentuating the positive, getting a grip, etc.
103 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Charlotte, NC on July 2, 1994, 982 F Supp 1101, 1112
(D SC 1997) (finding that plaintiff did take reasonable steps to mitigate emotional distress dam-
ages by choosing to make "major efforts in other ways ... [including an] attitude of self-reliance
and determination").
104 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Charlotte, NC, 982 F Supp at 1105, 1110.
105 Id at 1105.
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a hobby that "gives him a sense of purpose."'. In announcing its award
of damages, the court stated:
[T]he court finds that Mr. DeMary's choice not to take antide-
pressant medications is not a wholly unreasonable choice. He has,
instead, made major efforts in other ways and obviously declined
the reliance on medication based on the same attitude of self-
reliance and determination that have brought him this far in his
recovery. Therefore, the court does not find this personal choice
to be a failure to mitigate damages under the present circum-
stances.""
2. The problems of a willpower mitigation standard.
The overwhelming flaw with a willpower standard is that, like
emotional distress itself, it is subjective and not necessarily verifiable.
Other difficult mitigation judgments, like whether a wrongfully dis-
charged plaintiff took reasonable efforts to find a new job, may be
subjective, but they have obvious and well-settled objective correlates,
like mailing out resumes and going to interviews. Willpower mitiga-
tion, on the other hand, does not lend itself to judicial administra-
tion-it would be an unguided, freeform jury inquiry, based primarily
on plaintiff's credibility. The inquiry would be made particularly diffi-
cult by the fact the willpower probably varies considerably across in-
dividuals, so no one standard could capture "reasonableness."
Furthermore, the plaintiff possesses all the information on
whether he mitigated, and yet the defendant bears the burden of
proof. Thus it would be exceedingly difficult for defendants to know
whether to raise the mitigation defense; litigation would be costly since
the defense could never be disposed of on summary judgment; and it
might turn out to be a practical impossibility for a defendant ever to
prove that plaintiff did not try to exercise self-control. Thus a will-
power mitigation standard would likely be a dead letter, and not a
practical tool for restraining moral hazard.
IV. HOW TO REDUCE MORAL HAZARD WITHOUT ADOPTING A
MITIGATION RULE
In the absence of a workable mitigation rule, courts and legisla-
tures must turn to other solutions for the moral hazard problem.
There are only two ways to reduce moral hazard in first- or third-party
insurance: (1) observe the behavior of the insured and condition re-
imbursement on the appropriate level of care; or (2) limit the overall
106 Id.
107 Id at 1112 (emphasis added).
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amount of reimbursement available. In tort insurance, the affirmative
defense of failure to mitigate serves as the mechanism through which
plaintiff's ex post care might be observed, and recovery conditioned
on the exercise of care. But, as Part III has shown, emotional distress
damages do not lend themselves to the application of workable miti-
gation standards. First-party insurers respond to moral hazard by pro-
viding less than full coverage against loss when observation of ex post
care is either impossible, unreliable, or too expensive. 'O' The tort sys-
tem must also turn to Some form of partial compensation to reduce
the moral hazard associated with emotional distress damages.
This Part considers possible alternatives to a mitigation rule to
limit the moral hazard in emotional distress liability. Part IV.A consid-
ers limitations on the size of recovery, such as damage caps, floors, and
multipliers. In general, such mechanisms may often relocate moral
hazard instead of reducing it, and could not easily be applied to the
independent emotional torts. Part IV.B discusses from a mitigation
perspective the categories the common law has used to limit the scope
of emotional distress liability, such as the requirement of a physical in-
jury, physical manifestation, malicious intent, or, more recently, con-
temporaneous perception of the death of a family member. This
"categorical approach," invented by courts to weed out trivial, feigned,
and imagined claims, should be used for an independent reason. The
categorical approach best controls moral hazard because it uses cir-
cumstances beyond plaintiffs' control as a proxy for their emotional
distress. Moreover, by preventing recovery in cases where the initial
distress is likely to be small, the categorical approach eliminates the
cases that might cause the most moral hazard while allowing recovery
for plaintiffs who have been most seriously injured.
A. Limiting Damages
1. Copayments and deductibles.
Ideally, tort law would respond to hard-to-monitor moral hazard
the same way first-party insurance does-with a system of copayments
and deductibles. In other words, the jury would determine the plain-
tiff's level of emotional distress, but damages would only be granted
for some percentage of the distress. The percentage would be higher in
contexts where moral hazard is likely to be greater.'08 This is a radical
108 See Shavell, 93 Q J Econ at 544-46 (cited in note 40) (showing that insurers will not
provide full coverage when they cannot observe care, with the amount of coverage decreasing as
observation costs increase).
109 See Part I.C.
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suggestion: the tort system does not in other contexts use coinsur-
ance.
Emotional distress may not be the best context to pioneer a coin-
surance scheme for third-party liability. Juries often use emotional dis-
tress damages as a substitute for punitive damages.'" Furthermore,
some evidence suggests juries award emotional distress damages as a
way of covering plaintiffs' legal fees.12 Thus, if juries know in advance
the copayment percentage, they might simply adjust upwards their ini-
tial assessment of the distress level to compensate for the copayment.
Of course, judges could police this problem through remittitur.
Yet remittitur is an imperfect solution. It only allows judges to set
aside awards that are "so grossly disproportionate to any injury estab-
lished by the evidence as to be unconscionable as a matter of law.""'
And, courts are particularly reluctant to second guess emotional dis-
tress awards.14
2. Damage ceilings and floors.
Caps or ceilings are a popular tort reform measure, adopted in a
great number of jurisdictions, usually by the legislature,"5 but some-
times by the judiciary."6 Statutory damage limitations have been par-
ticularly popular for nonpecuniary damages"7 and punitive damages."'
110 See Priest, 96 Yale L J at 1553 (cited in note 35) ("Third-party insurance through the tort
system, in contrast [to first-party insurance], never incorporates deductibles or co-insurance to
control victim moral hazard.").
111 See Daryl L. Wiesen, Note, Following the Lead of Defamation: A Definitional Balancing
Approach to Religious Torts, 105 Yale L J 291,294 (1995) ("[D]ue to the difficulty of determining
,actual injury' in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, damages that are compensa-
tory in name tend to be punitive in nature.").
112 See W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 114 (Harvard 1991) (discussing evi-
dence that nonpecuniary damages usually comprise a proportion of total damage award roughly
equivalent to a contingent fee percentage and hypothesizing that juries may be engaged in im-
plicit fee shifting).
113 Koster v Trans World Airlines, Inc, 181 F3d 24, 34 (1st Cir 1999) ("We will not disturb an
award of damages because it is extremely generous or because we think the damages are consid-
erably less.").
114 See Tompkins v Cyr, 202 F3d 770,783 (5th Cir 2000) ("Our review of a damage award
for emotional distress and mental anguish is conducted with deference to the fact-finder because
of the intangibility of the harms suffered.").
115 See Priest, 96 Yale L J at 1587 (cited in note 35) (noting that forty-two states have re-
cently adopted some form of tort reform, generally damage caps on both noneconomic and puni-
tive damages).
116 The Supreme Court of Canada has adopted caps on nonpecuniary damages by decision.
See Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta, Ltd, 83 DLR 3d 452,477-78 (1978) (holding that victims of
nonpecuniary loss are "entitled to a more or less equal measure of compensation for similar
nonpecuniary loss").
117 This broad category includes everything from pain and suffering to loss of consortium.
Limitations on nonpecuniary recovery are often imposed only in certain tort contexts, particu-
larly medical malpractice or products liability. See Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort
Reform, Tort Theory and Beyond, 65 NYU L Rev 23,59 n 72 (1990).
The University of Chicago Law Review
The advantages and disadvantages of these reforms have been exten-
sively discussed, "9 and this Comment does not take a position on this
wider issue. However, caps might not be very useful in combating
moral hazard in emotional distress.
As substitutes for a mitigation rule, the weakness of caps is that
they do not affect moral hazard at all for all D' below the statutory
ceiling. Damage caps (unless they are very low) would only limit
moral hazard at the high end, but in consequential damages cases,
moral hazard seems most severe at the low range of initial distress.'2
Thus in consequential cases, the cap would have to be set very low
(relative to current nonpecuniary damage caps) to have any effect on
most cases. On the other hand, a damage floor might cut out the mor-
ally hazardous low end of distress in consequential cases. '
However, a floor, like any all-or-nothing limitation, would intro-
duce the subjective severity problem encountered in the independent
emotional torts, with plaintiffs having an incentive to not mitigate un-
til D' clears the statutory floor. This problem can be partially reme-
died by only allowing recovery for the portion of damages above the
floor. Thus if the floor is $20,000 and plaintiff has $25,000 in damages,
he recovers $5,000. This also has the advantage of reducing some of
the all-or-nothing unfairness of statutory cutoffs. However, it amounts
to a deductible, with the problems discussed in Part IV.A.1. Perhaps
the best of both worlds would be a floor to eliminate the low-end
moral hazard associated with consequential distress, coupled with a
ceiling to prevent juries from inflating their original damage figure to
make up for the deductible that they know plaintiff will face.
Ceilings and floors would work differently when applied to the
independent torts because the severity requirements themselves act as
a floor requirement. Thus floors would be superfluous. Caps, however,
seem to contradict the general policy behind the independent torts,
118 See Steven R. Salbu, Developing Rational Punitive Damages Policies: Beyond the Consti-
tution, 49 Fla L Rev 247,297-98 (1997) (discussing various states' statutory caps and multipliers
to limit punitive damages).
119 See, for example, Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability at 115 (cited in note 112) (dis-
cussing inequities caused by statutory caps); Komesar, 65 NYU L Rev at 53-55 (cited in note
117) (discussing effect statutory caps have of relocating damage decisions from juries, who are
hard to influence ex ante, to legislatures,. who can be lobbied ex ante by powerful interest
groups); Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein, 83 Nw U L Rev at 957-58 (cited in note 67) (discussing
arbitrariness of damage caps).
120 See Part II.C.1.
121 See Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein, 83 Nw U L Rev at 959-60 (cited in note 67) (rec-
ommending "flexible ranges" created by combination of floors and ceilings as a preferable alter-
native to simple caps). Some commentators have also suggested using a combination of ceilings
and floors. See American Law Institute, 2 Reporters' Study: Enterprise Responsibility for Personal
Injury 221-30 (1991) (recommending combination of ceilings and floors for noneconomic tort
damages, with floor designed to preclude minor claims).
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which is to grant full recovery for serious emotional injuries. Thus nei-
ther caps nor floors seem satisfactory in the independent tort context.
3. Damage multiples and schedules.
Damage multiples may offer a promising way of controlling
moral hazard for consequential distress, but would be harder to im-
plement for intentional torts. Statutory caps and floors suffer from the
problem that they might only shift or relocate the incidence of moral
hazard. But because moral hazard arises only when plaintiff's level of
care affects the amount of his recovery, tying the damage measure to
something beyond plaintiff's control will be a powerful way of pre-
venting moral hazard. If emotional distress compensation is inde-
pendently fixed, it will not affect plaintiff's choice between D and D',
since recovery is independent of D'.
The multiples approach would set emotional distress damages at
some ratio of the underlying compensatory 'award."' In the punitive
damages context, multiples of compensatory damages have been criti-
cized as mixing apples and oranges." The opposite is true of multiples
for emotional distress, since compensatory and emotional distress
damages both seek to compensate the plaintiff. Indeed, the ratio plan
would also fit well with the judicial intuition that the severity of dis-
tress is positively correlated with the severity of the underlying injury.
The ratio need not be constant:"' thus courts can have the multiple in-
crease as consequential damages increase."
However, with IIED and NIED, there are no underlying nonemo-
tional damages, and thus nothing to multiply. Still, plaintiffs often
plead the independent emotional torts alongside other independent
torts, like sexual harassment or wrongful discharge. In such cases,
courts could use a reverse multiplier approach, where the emotional
distress recovery would not be allowed to exceed some fixed propor-
tion of the recovery on the independent nonemotional claims. Still,
this plan could not be generally applied because IIED and NIED are
122 See Salbu, 49 Fla L Rev at 297-98 (cited in note 118) (discussing varieties of damage ra-
tio regimes for punitive damages). Ratios can be used either as fixed levels of recovery, in which
case they resemble schedules of the sort used in workmen's compensation, or as a more flexible
version of damage caps. The present discussion sees multiples as fixing recovery, rather than cap-
ping it.
123 See id at 299-300 (criticizing multiples because punitive damages "bear[ I no logical
proportional relation to the amount of the compensatory damages award," since the former
seeks to deter while the latter seeks to compensate).
124 See Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein, 83 Nw U L Rev at 940 (cited in note 67) (proposing
comprehensive scheduling regime for nonpecuniary injuries with nonlinear severity multiplier).
125 But see id at 939 n 153 (criticizing such simple form of scheduling for, among other
faults, creating "too great an incentive for malingering and other forms of moral hazard which
would increase economic harm" and thus the fixed noneconomic damage award).
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so often the sole claims in a suit, and the uniformity engendered by
general application is seen as one of the key virtues of any fixed re-
covery scheme.
Schedules are a more sophisticated and elaborate (and adminis-
tratively cumbersome) version of damage multiples, where various
factors combine to yield fixed recoveries for various classes of injuries.
Workmen's compensation remains the paradigmatic case of legislative
scheduling, but some scholars have developed a proposed scheduling
model for nonpecuniary injuries.26 This scheduling scheme effectively
addresses moral hazard concerns by basing award levels on "objective
factors reasonably related to non-economic loss,' '27 and thus beyond
plaintiff's ex post control.
The primary weakness of the proposed matrix from a mitigation
perspective is that the specific damage valuations are calculated based
on past jury verdicts." This method succeeds in addressing the primary
concern of its proponents -reducing variance in awards by taking
them out of the hands of the jury."' But acknowledging the mitigation
problem in emotional distress shows that not only is the variance too
high, but also so is the mean. Thus basing award values on past ver-
dicts would simply perpetuate the overcompensation caused by un-
mitigated moral hazard. Yet without past jury verdicts as a guide, there
is no obvious way to establish matrix values without risking arbitrari-
ness and error. And as with multiples, applying the schedule to IIED
and NIED seems incoherent.
B. Limiting Availability of Emotional Distress Recovery
Recognizing the moral hazard problems inherent in emotional
distress suggests courts should not expand the scope of such liability
any further, for doing so would only expand the scope of the moral
hazard. The mitigation problem lends additional support to the pos-
ture of courts that have not recognized bystander liability, do not al-
low general NIED claims, require physical manifestation of injuries,
and only grant consequential damages when parasitic to physical inju-
ries. Further, the mitigation problem suggests that judges should reject
efforts by plaintiffs to recover emotional distress damages in novel
contexts. Finally, the mitigation problem suggests that courts that have
already allowed a broad expansion of emotional distress liability
126 See id at 938-65.
127 Id at 939 (suggesting the most appropriate objective factors to be considered are "the
severity of the [economic] injury, the injured person's age, and the body part affected").
128 See id at 942 (suggesting "basing matrix values on the awards for nonpecuniary injuries
of past juries, preferably as adjusted by the trial and appellate courts").
129 See id at 919-25 (presenting empirical evidence of high variability and explaining why it
is a problem).
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should be open to defendants' efforts to partially undo some of this
expansion by, for example, reintroducing the physical injury require-
ment. The weakness of such doctrinal limitations is that while they ef-
fectively contain the scope of the moral hazard problem, they do not
at all reduce the severity of moral hazard in the sets of cases where li-
ability will be allowed. Ideally, the doctrinal limitations on liability
would limit it to sets of cases where moral hazard would be less se-
vere.
Any solution that limits liability or recovery raises the question of
whether in an attempt to rectify undesirable systematic overcompen-
sation, the solution might cause systematic undercompensation.' The
answer to this is two-fold. First, the categorical approach does not
deny recovery across the board, but rather attempts to focus on the
types of cases where moral hazard would be the highest. By cutting
out the most morally hazardous cases, while allowing full recovery in
the rest, such a solution may overcompensate some individual plain-
tiffs but on a systemic level could outperform the status quo.
Second, even if the solution results in some systematic under-
compensation, this might be preferable to overcompensation. Over-
compensation leads to the unraveling of both first- and third-party in-
surance functions by aggravating the adverse selection problems in-
herent in insurance."' Overcompensation, when reflected in the in-
creased cost of the products, services, or activities that give rise to li-
ability, means that people will have to "purchase" a higher level of in-
surance than they would prefer. Those for whom the difference in
what they would pay and what they must pay is greatest will begin
dropping out of the risk pool (by no longer using the product or ser-
vice or engaging in the activity).' As the low-value people drop out,
the insurance premium must get progressively higher, because it re-
flects the value of compensation to the average member of the risk
group. Thus overcompensation can, ironically, result in many people
having no compensation at all because they have been priced out of
the market.'
130 Of course, emotional distress law has always recognized that it should not attempt to
compensate every emotional injury, and the current law, by not granting recovery for many types
of distress (such as non-severe distress caused by negligence), recognizes that the goal of indi-
vidual compensation must often be partially sacrificed to obtain better systemwide results.
131 See Priest, 96 Yale L J at 1540-41 (cited in note 35).
132 See id at 1574-77 (explaining unraveling in third-party insurance and offering empirical
evidence of the phenomenon).
133 See id at 1564-65 (discussing how low-risk consumers, or those whose expected damages
are lower than the average compensation, will stop using the product or service altogether, and
using four-wheel drive vehicles as an example).
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C. Eliminating the Subjective Severity Requirement
Requiring plaintiffs' distress to be severe while making severity ajury question tends to exacerbate moral hazard in the absence of a
mitigation rule. Creating more objective medical tests of severity, as
some commentators have suggested, will not help: these methods may
be useful in separating genuine from feigned distress, but the distress
caused by failure to mitigate must be considered genuine. The older
approach of using objective proxies, such as physical injury, based on
the cause of the distress and the manner of its infliction would be
more effective than a subjective severity standard. While plaintiffs'
level of care can affect their level of distress, it cannot affect the source
or type of the distress. Thus the jurisdictions that have not abandoned
the physical injury requirement should not do so, and those that have
should rediscover it. Moreover, this suggests that courts should adhere
to the categorical approach in NIED, and strictly and carefully delimit
the boundaries of those categories.
CONCLUSION
Emotional distress liability creates particular problems of moral
hazard that courts have not yet taken into account. This moral hazard
cannot be readily controlled with the standard judicial tool, the miti-
gation defense. The vagueness and subjectivity that permeate emo-
tional distress recovery no doubt contribute to the difficulty in craft-
ing an administrable mitigation rule. But absent such a rule, emotional
distress invites moral hazard and leads to systematic overcompensa-
tion. To contain this moral hazard, courts should halt the expansion of
emotional distress liability. Then courts should insist that emotional
distress plaintiffs prove their distress by pointing to objective proxies,
which do not depend on plaintiffs' ex post level of care, such as physi-
cal injury.
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